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JAMES A. TAYLOR*
EDWIN A. VERMULSTt

Disclosure of Confidential Information
in Antidumping and Countervailing
Duty Proceedings Under United States
Law: A Framework for the European

Communities
The Commission of the European Communities is currently investigating the possibility of releasing confidential information submitted by
parties in an antidumping or countervailing duty investigation, to other
parties in that investigation.' In line with this investigation, the authors
believe that a study of the American system of disclosure of confidential
or privileged information under administrative or judicial protective order
would be beneficial to the Commission for several reasons. First, both

the European Communities and the United States are members of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and consequently are
bound by the provisions of GATT and the 1979 GATT Antidumping and
Subsidies Codes. Furthermore, the United States is one of the few nations
in the world to allow release of confidential information in antidumping

*Business Affairs Counsel with Scotti Brothers Pictures in Los Angeles.
tMember of the firm of Van Bael & Bellis, Brussels. Mr. Vermulst was a foreign associate
at O'Melveny & Myers, Washington, D.C. when this article was prepared.
The authors would like to thank Lynn Barden, Jacques Bourgeois, Robert Cassidy, John
Greenwald, David Hartquist, Sheila Landers, Bill Leonard, Terry Link, Patrick McCrory,
Mike Stein, and Terry Stewart for their willingness to answer our questions. Furthermore,
we acknowledge with special gratitude the helpful comments of Gary Horlick, Peter Ehrenhaft, John Mangan, and Richard Cunningham on previous drafts of this article.
1.Address by J.H.J. Bourgeois, Head of Directorate-General I, Division I.C.I. in Charge
of Instruments of Autonomous and Conventional Commercial Policy, Dumping, Countervailing Duties and Safeguard Measures, Fordham Conference, New York City (Oct. 4, 1985).
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and countervailing duty cases. Thirdly, and most importantly, the United
States has had seven years of experience with a system that has functioned
very satisfactorily. 2 This conclusion is buttressed by the current sense
among practitioners that the disclosure provisions do not go far enough
and that changes should be implemented to allow for more disclosure of
confidential information, especially at the level of the International Trade
3
Commission.

This article describes the functioning of the American system in law
and in practice, offers suggestions for improvement, and studies the extent
to which adoption of a similar framework in the European Communities
is feasible and desirable.
I. Disclosure of Confidential Information in Antidumping
and Countervailing Duty Cases Under American Law
A.

HISTORY

In 1979 Congress adopted the Trade Agreements Act (TAA) 4 not only
to implement the results of the Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, but to revise extensively U.S. antidumping and countervailing
duty legislation as well. Called "[o]ne of the most controversial provisions" of the TAA, 5 Section 7776 introduced the concept of disclosure of
confidential information submitted by petitioners and respondents in antidumping or countervailing duty cases. The rationale was relatively
straight-forward:
Section 777 provides the maximum availability of information to interested
parties consistent with the need to provide adequate protection for information
accorded confidential treatment. Petitioners under the antidumping and countervailing duty laws have long contended that their ability to obtain relief has
been impaired by its [sic] lack of access to the information presented by the
exporters and foreign manufacturers. By the same token, importers, exporters,
and other respondents in such cases have complained of lack of access to

2. Interview with Gary N. Horlick, Former Deputy Assistant Secretary for Import Administration, International Trade Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce (Dec. 5, 1985).
3. During December 1985 and January 1986 the authors interviewed the following attorneys
active in the international trade field: Messrs. Lynn Barden, Robert Cassidy, Richard Cunningham, Peter Ehrenhaft, John Greenwald, David Hartquist, Gary Horlick, Bill Leonard,
John Mangan, Patrick McCrory, Mike Stein, and Terry Stewart. These attorneys represent
both domestic and foreign interests. Most of the interviewees agreed that disclosure at the
ITC level should be expanded. At the same time, however, the general feeling was that
legislative action would be necessary to accomplish this goal.
4. Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144 (codified in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.).
5. Garfinkel, Disclosure of Confidential Documents Under the Trade Agreements Act of
1979: A Corporate Nightmare?, 13 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 465 (1981).
6. 19 U.S.C. § 1677f (Supp. 11 1984).
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information supplied by the domestic parties to such cases, particularly with
7
respect to the economic health of the domestic industry involved.

A characteristic that antidumping and countervail cases share with competition cases is that they are highly technical and fact-determined. 8 Consequently it is very difficult, if not impossible, to prepare an adequate
defense to an opponent's arguments without having access to the facts
on which those arguments are based. Those facts, however, at the same
time concern a competitor's cost of production, profits, volume of sales,
customers, etc., and therefore constitute the competitor's core of business
secrets.

The purpose of section 777 of the TAA was to strike a balance between
these conflicting interests. It has been observed that "prior to 1980, when
no confidential information was made available to the other side, proceedings consisted of both parties frequently 'shooting in the dark,' with
a good dose of trial by surprise." 9
B.

BACKGROUND

At the administrative level two agencies are involved in the conduct of
antidumping or countervailing duty investigations. The International Trade

Administration of the U.S. Department of Commerce (ITA) determines
whether dumping or subsidization exist. The U.S. International Trade
Commission (ITC), an independent government agency, investigates
whether dumped or subsidized imports cause material injury to the subject

U.S. domestic industry.
If the petition alleges injurious dumping, the ITA will send out

questionnaires to foreign producers/exporters and domestic importers
and at a later stage of the proceeding visit the companies to verify
the information contained in the questionnaire responses. In the case

of subsidization, the questionnaire is sent to the embassy of the country
allegedly subsidizing exports to the United States. The latter will
normally forward the questionnaire to the authorities administering the
subsidy programs. Verification of questionnaire responses will then
take place both at the governmental and at the individual company
level. 10

7. S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 100 (1979).
8. For a comparison of the basics of U.S. and EC antidumping laws, see E. VERMULST,
ANTIDUMPING LAW AND PRACTICE
MUNITIES (forthcoming 1987).

IN

THE

UNITED

STATES

AND
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EUROPEAN

COM-

9. Memorandum of Horlick, Bello, O'Melveny & Myers, Comments on Draft Recommendations: ITC Protective Orders Project (1984).
10. The latter is presumably necessitated by Commerce's adoption of the "benefit to the
WINTER 1987
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The ITC, on the other hand, assesses the health of the domestic industry
and determines whether the dumped or subsidized imports have caused
injury. While the ITC will focus on information supplied by petitioners
and other segments of the industry involved, the causation requirement
nevertheless forces the ITC to a certain extent to consider the effects of
quantities and prices of imports, based on information submitted by respondents. Obviously, petitioners will be primarily interested in data that
the ITA obtained, while both petitioners and respondents will try to obtain
access to information at the ITC level. In addition, both parties have an
interest in access to the internal working documents that the agencies use
for the preparation of their decision. The agencies, on the other hand,
have a certain interest in a "true and uninhibited exchange of opinions
and recommendations requisite to proper administrative determinations.""
C.

THE LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK

Section 77712 as amended 13 provides that confidential information submitted to the administering agencies shall not be disclosed to anyone
without the consent of the person submitting it. 14 However, any person
who requests confidential treatment of information must simultaneously
submit a nonconfidential summary in sufficient detail to permit a reasonable understanding of the substance of the confidential information. Otherwise, the party submitting the information must provide a statement as
to why the information is not susceptible to such a summary. 15 In addition,
the party must submit a statement that it does or does not authorize release
of the information under an administrative protective order. 16
Under section 777, if the agency involved determines that the designation as confidential is unwarranted, it will return the data to the party
submitting it and decide the case on the basis of the best information
available, unless the party persuades the agency that the designation is
warranted, or withdraws the designation. 17 If the agency agrees with the
producer" test as opposed to the "cost to the government"

test. See, e.g., Railcars from

Canada, 48 Fed. Reg. 6,569 (1983). For a discussion of the compatability of this approach
with the GATT Subsidies Code, see Simon, Can GATT Export Subsidy Standards Be Ignored
By the United States in Imposing Countervailing Duties?, 5 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 183

(1983); Holmer, Haggerty & Hunter, Identifying and Measuring Subsidies Under the Countervailing Duty Law: An Attempt at Synthesis, in THE COMMERCE DEPARTMENT SPEAKS
ON IMPORT ADMINISTRATION AND EXPORT ADMINISTRATION 301, 482-562 (1984).
II. Chevron Standard, Ltd. v. United States, 4 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1572, 1573 (1983).
12. 19 U.S.C. § 1677f(Supp. 11 1984).

13. Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-573, § 619, 98 Stat. 3024, 3038 (1984).
14. 19 U.S.C. § 1677f(b)(I) (Supp. 11 1984).
15. Id. § 1677f(b)(1)(A).

16. Id. § 1677f(b)(1)(B).
17. Id. § 1677f(b)(2).
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party submitting the confidential information concerning the need for
confidentiality, it may nevertheless decide to make the information available under an administrative protective order upon receipt of an application (before or after actually receiving the confidential information)
which (1) describes with particularity the information requested and (2)
sets forth the reasons for the request.' 8 Under this statutory provision,
counsel for "interested parties" to the proceeding may have access to
confidential information subject to the protective order. The statute and
the regulations promulgated thereunder specify that the following entities
or persons can be "interested parties:"
a. a foreign manufacturer, producer, or exporter, or the United States
importer of merchandise which is the subject of an investigation
under the unfair trade laws or a trade or business association a
majority of the members of which are importers of such merchandise,
b. the government of a country in which such merchandise is produced
or manufactured,
c. a manufacturer, producer, or wholesaler in the United States of a
like product,
d. a certified union or recognized union or group of workers which is
representative of an industry engaged in the manufacture, production, or wholesale in the United States of a like product,
e. a trade or business association, a majority of whose members manufacture, produce or wholesale a like product in the United States,
and
f. an association, a majority of whose members is composed of interested parties described in subparagraph (C), (D), or (E) with respect
to a like product.19
With regard to the substance of the protective order, the law merely
provides that the agencies shall promulgate regulations containing requirements and sanctions. 20 These regulations are discussed in the text
that follows.
If the ITA denies a request for disclosure of confidential information
or the ITC refuses to make available information concerning domestic
price or cost of production of the product (and such information has been
submitted by the petitioner or an interested party in support of the petitioner), the person adversely affected by the decision may apply in the
Court of International Trade (CIT) for a court order directing the agency

18. Id. § 1677f(c)(1)(A).

19. Id. § 1677f(g), as amended by Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-573, §
619, 98 Stat. 3024, 3028 (1984).
20. 19 U.S.C. § 1677f(c)(1)(B) (Supp. 11 1984).

WINTER 1987
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involved to make the information available. 2 1 A request for such an interlocutory order does not stop or suspend the agency's investigation.
The CIT may issue an order under such conditions and including such
sanctions for breach as it deems appropriate if it finds that, "under the
standards applicable in proceedings of the court," a protective order is
warranted. According to the legislative history, the phrase quoted above
was intended to: "refer to the [CIT's] practice of determining de novo,
after, if necessary, an in camera examination of the documents, whether
the need of the party requesting the information outweighs the need of
the party submitting the information for continued confidential treat22
ment."
While the text of the statute merely contemplates the possibility of
appeal concerning an agency order that refuses to release confidential
material, the CIT has interpreted its jurisdiction broadly. In Sacilor, Acieries et Lam inoirs de Lorraine v. United States2 3 the CIT enjoined the
U.S. Department of Commerce from disclosing confidential documents
that had been submitted by foreign steel producers in response to antidumping questionnaires.
The CIT can also order disclosure during judicial review of the agency's
determination. 24 The Trade Agreements Act established an elaborate system of judicial review of antidumping and countervailing duty determinations. During such a review, which is conducted on the basis of the
administrative record, the parties will generally try to obtain access to
the confidential information submitted to the administrative agencies in
the course of the proceeding. If such a request is made, the CIT will
examine the documents in camera and decide whether access by counsel
is necessary. This issue is discussed more extensively in section F below.
D.

COMMERCE REGULATIONS

25

Pursuant to its statutory mandate, the U.S. Department of Commerce
(Commerce) has issued detailed regulations on confidential documents
and their disclosure. Ordinarily, Commerce will only consider information
to be government confidential, business proprietary, or privileged if its
disclosure would be likely to: (1) cause substantial harm to the competitive
position of the supplier; or (2) have a substantial adverse effect upon the

21. Id. § 1677f(c)(2). The jurisdiction of the CIT to entertain such actions is based on 28
U.S.C. § 1581(f) (1982).
22. S. REp. No. 249, supra note 7, at 100.
23. 542 F. Supp. 1020, 3 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 2225 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1982). The foreign producers
based their cause of action on 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i) (1982).
24. See 19 U.S.C. § 1516(a) (Supp. 11 1984); 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c) (1982).
25. E.g., 19 C.F.R. §§ 353.28-31 (1985).
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supplier; or (3) impair the ability of the U.S. Government to obtain in the
26
future information from the same or similar suppliers.
On the basis of these standards, Commerce will ordinarily regard as
business proprietary that information concerning business or trade secrets, production costs, distribution costs, prices, customers and names
of persons from whom confidential information was obtained. On the other
hand, all information that is published or otherwise available to the public
(price lists, published sales conditions, laws, regulations, etc.) is considered appropriate for disclosure. The same applies to information submitted
by petitioners or by other domestic interested parties concerning the
operations of a foreign interested party, unless such disclosure might
reveal the identity of confidential sources. It is incumbent upon the party
submitting the information to request that Commerce treat the information
as either government confidential or business proprietary.
These standards are not used to determine whether documents are to
be disclosed under an administrative protective order. That is the second
step. At this point, Commerce merely decides whether designation as
confidential is in conformity with the applicable standards. If so, it will
accept the designation. If not, the information will be returned to the
submitting party and not considered in the proceeding unless the party
involved agrees to change the designation or provide a nonconfidential
summary.
Even after Commerce has determined that certain documents should
be considered confidential, however, they may still be disclosed to an
attorney or other representative of a party to the proceeding under an
administrative protective order.27 The application must be filed by the
attorney or other representative and must: (1) describe with particularity
the information requested and set forth the reasons for the request; (2)
indicate the procedures to be followed to avoid unauthorized disclosure;
and (3) demonstrate good cause of disclosure. Following legislative directives, 28 Commerce generally will allow disclosure only to attorneys
who are subject to disbarment from practice in the event of violation. 29
However, under certain conditions Commerce will also allow disclosure

26. E.g., id. § 353.29.
27. E.g., id. § 353.30.

28. S. REP. No. 249, supra note 7, at 101.
29. In the United States, in order to legally practice law, a person must pass the bar
examination of the jurisdiction in which he will practice. Obviously, only those having passed
the bar are subject to disbarment. Both in-house counsel and retained counsel will normally
have passed at least one bar examination. For the relevance of the distinction, see infra
text accompanying notes 67-81. If Commerce determines to allow disclosure to, for example, an industry expert, it will hold the attorneys liable for unauthorized disclosure.
Interview with Richard Cunningham (Feb. It, 1986).
WINTER 1987
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to experts, such as economists or accountants, employed by the attorney
or by the party to the investigation whom the attorney represents. In
determining whether to grant or refuse disclosure, Commerce applies a
balancing test in which it weighs not only the need of the person requesting
the data and the need of the person submitting it for continued confidential
treatment, but also takes account of the probable effectiveness of sanctions.
In addition, Commerce will normally consider the need of the government to obtain information in future trade cases. Thus, in Monsanto
Industrial Chemicals Co. v. United States, 30 the CIT agreed with Com-

merce's refusal to disclose customer name lists to petitioner, because
inter alia, "release of such requested sensitive documents at the primary
stage of an investigation leading to judicial review without compelling
reasons surely dampens the propensity of foreign producers to divulge
confidential information in future trade cases." 3 1 Commerce almost always refuses to disclose customers' names because, in its opinion, this
type of information is irrelevant to the determination of dumping.
The balancing test is an issue with which both Commerce and the CIT
have repeatedly grappled. In Sacilor, Acieries et Laminoirs de Lorraine

v. United States, 32 for example, the CIT enjoined Commerce from disclosing to petitioners confidential information submitted by foreign producers in response to questionnaires, because Commerce had violated
the statute which "displays an extreme sensitivity to the handling of
confidential information."' 33 The CIT noted that:
[T]he release of confidential information must be the result of a reasoned decision which carefully evaluates the need of the applicant as opposed to the
demands of confidentiality. This decision should not confuse the role and need
of a party to an administrative investigation with that of a litigant in a court of
law and34it should not reflect an abdication of the investigative duties of the
agency.
While the court ostensibly grappled with this "balancing test," the
parties never really disputed what was to be disclosed. In reality, respondents went to the CIT in order to delay disclosure of confidential
data to U.S. Steel for as long as possible. This delaying aspect was never
noticed, or at least never acknowledged, by the CIT.
In Arbed S.A. v. United States 35 the court refused to grant an injunction
to prevent disclosure by Commerce of certain data to petitioners because
Commerce's decision did not involve an abuse of discretion nor an avoid30. 5 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1462 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983).
31. Id. at 1464.

32.
33.
34.
35.

3 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 2225 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985).
Id. at 2227.
Id.
3 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 2369 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1982).
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ance of the law. More importantly, the court recognized "a range of
discretion in the investigating agency to determine the degree of exposure
to confidential information consistent with the objectives of the investigation and the dictates of the law." 36 Commerce itself had taken the
position that counsel for petitioners should have access to more than
nonconfidential summaries because the use of indices or bracketed amounts
therein (instead of actual data on prices, expenses and costs) precluded
meaningful analysis: "We believe that petitioners should be allowed to
comment on a broader range of pertinent issues rather than be limited to
comments regarding only the methodology
used by the Department of
37
Commerce in calculating margins."
This lenient administrative attitude towards disclosure, together with
the CIT's grant of administrative discretion in this field, suggests that in
most cases counsel for petitioners will get access to confidential data
submitted by foreign producers. 38 If the submitting party objects to a
release of confidential information under a protective order, the materials
will be returned to that party and not considered in the investigation. This
action, however, will lead Commerce to use the "best information available," which can be the margins or subsidy amounts alleged (and often
inflated) by petitioner.
The protective order under which the information is made available to
the attorney or other representative of a party to the proceeding must
include a personal sworn statement by that person that he will:
1. not divulge the information to any person other than the ITA and
ITC case-handlers, the person from whom the information was obtained and other attorneys, acting on behalf of the same party or
persons other than attorneys employed or supervised by the attorney
who have furnished similar sworn statements (experts). Under no
circumstances can the attorney divulge the information to officers,
partners, associates, and employees of the party represented or to
any other domestic competitor of the foreign firm who supplied the
information;
2. use the information solely for the purposes of the proceeding then
inprogress;
3. take adequate precautions to ensure the security of the materials;
and
4. promptly report any breach to Commerce.

36. Id. at 2372.
37. Id. at 2371.
38. The exception to this rule, release of confidential materials submitted by foreign
governments, is discussed infra in the text accompanying notes 81-87. Occasionally, release
of confidential materials is subject to long delays at the ITA level.
WINTER 1987
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In addition, the person providing the statement must acknowledge that
in the case of breach:
(1) he, the firm of which he is a partner, associate, or employee and
his partners, associates, employers, and employees may be subject
to disbarment from practice before any agency of the Department
of Commerce for up to seven years following publication of the
breach;
(2) if he is an attorney, the breach shall be referred to the ethics panel
of the appropriate bar association; and
(3) he and his client may be subjected to appropriate administrative
sanctions, including striking from the record any submitted information, termination of the investigation, and revocation of any order
in effect. 39
E. ITC

REGULATIONS

40

The ITC, like Commerce, will not automatically accept any designation
of information as confidential, but will check whether the information
really should be kept confidential, that is, whether disclosure might impair
the ITC's ability to obtain such information in future trade cases or whether
disclosure would cause substantial harm to the competitive position of
the entity from which the data was obtained. Secretary of the ITC approves or denies the request for confidential treatment. In either case, an
appeal may be lodged against the decision at the administrative level. If
the ITC decides that certain materials are not entitled to confidential
treatment, the submitter is allowed to withdraw the tender. 4 1
Upon request of an attorney for an interested party to the investigation,
excepting corporate counsel, the secretary may make available confidential information concerning the domestic price and cost of production of
the like product submitted by the petitioner or by an interested party in
support of the petitioner to such attorney under an administrative pro39. 19 C.F.R. § 353.30(e) (1985).
40. Id. § 207.7; see also id. § 201.6(a), which defines confidential business information
as:

information which concerns or relates to the trade secrets, processes, operations, style
of works, or apparatus, or to the production, sales, shipments, purchases, transfers,
identification of customers, inventories, or amount or source of any income, profits, losses,
or expenditures of any person, firm, partnership, corporation, or other organization, or
other information of commercial value, the disclosure of which is likely to have the effect
of either (I) impairing the Commission's ability to obtain such information as is necessary
to perform its statutory functions, or (2) causing substantial harm to the competitive
position of the person, firm, partnership, corporation, or other organization from which
the information was obtained, unless the Commission is required by law to disclose such
information.
41. 19 C.F.R. § 201.6(g) (1985).
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tective order. The request must: (1) describe with particularity the information requested; (2) set forth the reasons for the request; (3) demonstrate
a substantial need for the information in the preparation of the case; and
(4) demonstrate that the attorney is unable without undue hardship to
obtain the substantial equivalent of the information by other means.
These restrictive ITC regulations do not strictly follow from the test of
the Trade Agreements Act. The relevant TAA provision states quite broadly
that the ITA and the ITC may disclose confidential information submitted
by parties to the proceeding. 42 The ITC interpretation, however, seems
to be a result of the provision that appeal of the CIT is only possible from

an ITC decision not to disclose data submitted by the petitioner or by an
interested party in support of the petitioner relating to the domestic price

and the cost of production of the like product. In addition the TAA does
not limit disclosure to retained counsel, as the ITC regulations do.
In practice, the ITC only discloses price and cost of production data
on an industry-wide'basis. Furthermore, it will not disclose data submitted

by foreign respondents or by domestic entities who are either not interested parties within the meaning of the law or who do not support the

petition. A sharp dichotomy exists, therefore, between Commerce and
ITC practice in disclosing confidential information, a dichotomy that might
be expressed as an "everything but" versus a "nothing but" approach.
As disclosure at the Commerce level mainly benefits U.S. producers (petitioners) while disclosure of ITC information would benefit both petitioners and the foreign producers/exporters, the differing attitudes of the
two agencies taken together give U.S. petitioners a clear advantage in
terms of adequately responding to their opponents' data.

42. It has been argued by at least one commentator that inclusion of the ITC disclosure
authorization in the Trade Agreements Act was a direct result of foreign government pressure
at the close of the Tokyo Round and was "a hazing requirement rather than a bona fide
effort to open the proceedings." Stein, Instant Replay: Appeals of ITC Commerce and
Labor Decisions, The Eighth Annual Judicial Conference of the United Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals, 92 F.R.D. 340, 349-50 (1981). The same argument was raised during
the authors' interview with Mike Stein, former General Counsel ITC (Dec. 30, 1985). The
history of the provision, however, goes further back. According to Peter Ehrenhaft, the
Deputy Assistant Secretary and Special Counsel (Tariff Affairs) at the Department of Treasury, who was (until the transfer of his function to Commerce in 1980) responsible for the
administration of the unfair trade laws, the first drafts of the legislation that became the
Trade Agreements Act of 1979 were prepared in his office and contemplated the type of full
disclosure of confidential information under protective order now in place at Commerce.
However, in the course of congressional consideration of the draft, the ITC objected to this
possible interference with its investigatory functions and departure from past practice, and
the provision was dropped. Objections to this action from a number of foreign interests,
primarily in the European Communities, persuaded the congressional staff to reincorporate
in the proposed bill the more limited provisions law. Letter from Peter Ehrenhaft to the
authors (Jan. 22, 1986).
WINTER 1987
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Over the last years, two diametrically opposed schools of thought have
developed that advocate changes in ITC practice, based on their respective perceptions of the role of that agency. Those who view the ITC as
an investigator 43 would like to limit further the release of confidential
information, thereby effectively increasing the ITC's power. On the other
hand, a number of people, especially practitioners active in the international trade field, 44 advocate expanded disclosure because they see the
ITC primarily as an adjudicator. They argue that if counsel for the parties
involved had access to more information, counsel could make more complete presentations, which, in turn, might help the ITC to make "better
informed determinations." 4 5 Most of the practitioners interviewed, however, agreed that the ITC itself was unlikely to modify its regulations and
that, therefore, legislative change would be necessary to accomplish expanded disclosure.
In the authors' opinion, no compelling reasons exist why disclosure at
the ITC level should not be broadened. The risks of leaks and chilling
effect on future cases, while theoretically relevant, have turned out to be
relatively unimportant in DOC practice. Only one concrete suspicion of
leakage has occurred in the last five years. 46 The chilling effect (i.e.,
refusal of parties to submit confidential information) has seldom been
realized because of Commerce's power to make its determinations in such
a case on the basis of the best information available. There is no reason
47
why the ITC experience should be different.
In addition, as a large number of recent ITC determinations have been
appealed, counsel eventually gains access to the confidential data anyway
during subsequent judicial proceedings. 48 Furthermore, basic principles
of procedural fairness would appear to require that all parties in an antidumping or countervailing duty investigation be subject to the same

43. See Anthony & Byrne, Safeguarding Confidential Information in ITC Injury Proceedings: Proposals to Reduce the Risks of Disclosure, 17 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1 (1985).
44. Ehrenhaft, A Practitioner'sResponse to the Anthony-Byrne Report: "it Ain't Necessarily So," 17 L. & PoL'Y INT'L Bus. 71, 72 (1985).
45. Id.

46. Id. at 75. Information, submitted in confidence by a surrogate country in a case
involving carbon steel plate from a nonmarket economy country, found its way into a
nonconfidential brief. After this information entered the public record, U.S. Steel utilized
it to file a subsequent antidumping petition against Finnish carbon steel plate. According
to John Mangan, attorney for U.S. Steel on trade litigation, it was the shortest petition U.S.
Steel ever filed. Interview with John Mangan (Jan. 2, 1986).
47. Although, at the ITC level, there might be a difference between information supplied
by petitioners or parties in support of the petition and information supplied by entities not
parties to the investigation. Limited disclosure of the information supplied by the latter
category might be justified. Interviews with Lynn Barden and Patrick McCrory (Dec. 23,
1985).
48. See infra text accompanying notes 53-66.
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disclosure regime and the inherent risks thereof. The authors believe that
the real reason for the ITC's reluctance to disclose confidential data 49 is
a fear of losing its position as sole finder and interpreter of the facts
throughout the proceeding. While understandable, this fear impinges on
the essentially mixed administrative-adversarial character of antidumping
and countervailing duty investigations and leads to a suboptimal use of
the resources that can be developed in an adversarial proceeding.
F.

THE COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE

The CIT has two opportunities to determine whether confidential documents should be disclosed under an administrative protective order.
First, a party whose request for disclosure during the investigation has
been denied by the administrative agencies, can immediately 50petition the
CIT for disclosure pursuant to section 777(c)(2) of the TAA:
[B]ecause the investigation in connection with which the information is sought
is not stayed or stopped by a court proceeding, it is assumed that the Chief
Judge of the Customs Court (now CIT) will act expeditiously to assign a judge
to cases arising under this section who will be available to conduct a hearing
whenever required and that a decision
as to whether or not to issue an order
51
will be reached as soon as possible.

This section has been discussed more extensively above. 52 Secondly, if,
after the investigation has been completed, certain parties decide to contest the administrative determinations before the CIT, the latter may examine, in camera, the confidential material and 53
disclose such material
under such terms and conditions as it may order.
Like the agencies, the CIT has adopted a balancing test in making its
decision on disclosure. A typical formulation
of the test can be found in
54
Roquette Freres v. United States:

This statute [§ 516A(b)(2)(B) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended] gives the
court wide latitude in determining whether or not to release confidential doc-

49. See generally Anthony & Byrne, supra note 43, in which the authors relied very
heavily on interviews with ITC officials.
50. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(c)(2) (Supp. 11 1984).
51. S. REP. No. 249, supra note 7, at 100.
52. See supra text accompanying notes 12-24.
53. Section 516A(b)(2)(B) of the Tariff Act of 1930 provides:
Confidential or privileged material. The confidential or privileged status accorded to any
documents, comments, or information shall be preserved in any action under this section.
Notwithstanding the preceding sentence, the court may examine, in camera, the confidential or privileged materials, and may disclose such material under such terms and
conditions as it may order.
54. 554 F. Supp. 1246, 1248, 4 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1388 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1982), discussed in
Stred, International Trade: Court of International Trade Disclosure of Confidential Information, 24 HARV. INT'L L.J. 219, 220-25 (1983).
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uments to parties involved in an antidumping proceeding. In making its determination, the court must consider (1) the needs of the litigants for data used
by the Government in order to adequately respond to the antidumping finding,
(2) the need of the Government in obtaining confidential information from businesses in future proceedings, and (3) the needs of the producers of sorbitol to
protect from disclosure information which, in the hands of a competitor, might
injure their respective positions in the industry.

While this case involved a request of French producers to obtain information, submitted by U.S. producers who were not petitioners in the
original antidumping action, a similar formula was used in American Spring
Wire Corp. v. United States,55 an action brought by U.S. producers to

obtain information submitted by foreign producers. 56 The balancing test
as quoted above represents the current state of the law.
It is on the basis of this test that the CIT will then balance "a party's
need for the information sought against the public interest in protecting
confidential business information recognized by § 516A(b)(2)(B) [of the
TAA] and inherent in the administrative authority's ability to effectively57
perform its investigative duties under the countervailing duty laws."
The result of the balancing test obviousiy depends on the type and sensitivity of the information sought. Past jurisprudence makes it clear that
the following considerations play a role in the CIT's decision whether or
not to grant disclosure:
1. The "age" of the information. Recent information will ordinarily
be considered more sensitive than older information. In Japan ExIan
Co. v. United States58 the CIT, after examination of the documents in
camera, permitted disclosure because "based on the fact that none of
the information contained therein is more recent than September 1979
with most of the information adduced dating back to 1978 or earlier,
...any sensitivity previously possessed by this data has become de
59
minimis."

55. 566 F. Supp. 1538, 4 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 2210 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983).
56. The court used the following balancing test:
By its terms this provision vests in the court discretion in determining whether to
release confidential documents to parties involved in countervailing duty cases. In
exercising its discretion, however, the court is guided by the following three considthe need of the litigants for data used by the government in order to respond
erations: (1)
adequately to subsidy findings, (2) the need of the government in obtaining confidential
information from businesses in future proceedings, and (3) the need of the foreign
manufacturer to protect from disclosure information which, in the hands of a competitor,
might injure its relative position in the industry.
566 F. Supp. at 1539.
57. Id. (citing Nakajima All Co. v. United States, 2 Ct. Int'l Trade 170, 174, 3 I.T.R.D.
(BNA) 1453 (1981)).
58. 1 Ct. Int'l Trade 286, 15-23 Cust. B. & Dec. 102, 3 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1008 (1981).
59. 15-23 Cust. B. & Dec. at 104, 3 I.T.R.D. (BNA) at 1010.
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2. The "origin" of the information. Information submitted by entities
who do not have a direct interest in the proceeding would probably be
considered more sensitive. 60 The related problems of information supplied by foreign governments and information contained in internal
working documents are discussed separately below.
3. The relevance of the documents to the administrativedeterminations. In American Spring Wire Corp.6 1 the CIT refused to release
documents concerning customer-related information because such information was "not directly relevant to the administrative determina-

tions.' '62

63
4. The motivation of the requestor.In Roses, Inc. v. United States

the CIT refused disclosure because plaintiff had not shown a "specific
need."
5. The "specificity" of the information requested. This argument is
obviously based on the theory that the more specific the information
is, the easier identification becomes. In Roquette Freres64 ITC reports
were disclosed as far as they contained "industry-wide aggregate data"
and not individual producer statistics.
6. Equitable arguments. In Nakajima All Co. v. United States65 the

court ordered disclosure of confidential documents to outside counsel
for Nakajima on the basis of equity and fundamental fairness because
defendant and SCM's outside counsel also had access to the documents

in question. 66

60. These conclusions rest on interpretation ad analogiam of the decision in Roquette
Freres in which the CIT held that information submitted by U.S. producers who were not
petitioners in the administrative proceeding was "totally protected" from disclosure. 554
F. Supp. at 1250.
61. 566 F. Supp. 1538, 4 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 2210 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983).
62. 566 F. Supp. at 1540; see Roquette Freres: "[W]here the information . . .requested
'directly related to an assessment of whether there is material injury or a threat of material
injury, and, consequently, germane to the major issues' of the case, disclosure was required."
554 F. Supp. at 1248 (citing Rhone Poulenc, Inc. v. United States, No. 81-87, slip op. (Ct.
Int'l Trade Sept. 29, 1981); see also Atlantic Sugar, Ltd. v. United States (Atlantic Sugar
I), 85 Cust. Ct. 128, 129, 2 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1546 (1980), where the CIT stated that plaintiffs
must demonstrate more than "mere curiosity or a vague groping for clues;" Rhone Poulenc,
Inc. v. United States, I Ct. Int'l Trade 116, 4 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1386 (1981). Lately, however,
this consideration seems to have become less important to the CIT. In Jernberg Forgings
Co. v. United States, 598 F. Supp. 390, 392, 6 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1602 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984),
the CIT argued that, as far as verification exhibits are concerned, "a party is not required
to express a particularized need for the data." Cf. Star Kist Foods, Inc. v. United States,
6 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1349 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984).
63. 2 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1548 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1981); cf. Jernberg Foigings Co. v. United
States, I Ct. Int'l Trade 116, 4 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1386 (1981).
64. 544 F. Supp. at 1248; see also Roquette Freres v. United States, 5 I.T.R.D. (BNA)
1658 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983).
65. 3 Ct. Int'l Trade 69, 3 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1974 (1982).
66. Cf. Ceramica Regiomontana v. United States (Ceramica 11),
557 F. Supp. 593, 59495, 4 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1481 (1982).
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7. The status of counsel of the requesting party. Until the decision in
the litigation brought by U.S. Steel, the CIT was extremely reluctant
to disclose confidential information to "in-house" or "corporate" counsel of parties. This issue is discussed directly below.

G.

CORPORATE VERSUS RETAINED COUNSEL

Most large companies today have an in-house legal staff that advises

them on a multitude of legal subjects, including international trade issues.
In addition, in-house attorneys, at least in some instances, can also be

assumed to play a role in the formulation of corporate policy. 67 It is this
combination of functions that could create problems in disclosing competitors' confidential business information to such attorneys. The problem

is particularly acute because antidumping and countervailing duty cases

very often involve companies with in-house counsel. 68 Consequently, the
69
CIT has had to face this problem from the inception of the TAA.
While the ITA, since 1981, provides access to corporate counsel, 70 the
ITC regulations still explicitly prohibit such release. Until 1983 the CIT
routinely refused to release confidential information to in-house counsel:
"The Court is of the opinion that in actions such as these the confidential

business information of business competitors should not be disclosed to
in-house counsel unless a party has no other reasonable way of adequately

preparing and presenting its arguments." 7 1 The CIT added that it did not
have doubts about the integrity of in-house counsel, but merely wanted

67. It should be noted, however, that this problem is not unique to in-house counsel.
Retained lawyers, for example, could be members of the board of directors of a company
they represent.
68. In litigation brought by U.S. Steel, 61 corporations in steel, chemical, automotive and
other industries filed an amicus curiae brief requesting disclosure to in-house counsel.
69. The problem has come up in the following cases: Atlantic Sugar, Ltd. v. United States
(Atlantic Sugar I), 85 Cust. Ct. 128, 2 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1546 (1980); Atlantic Sugar Ltd. v.
United States (Atlantic Sugar 11), 511 F. Supp. 819, 2 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1586 (1980); Connors
Steel Co. v. United States, 85 Cust. Ct. 112, 2 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1129 (1980); Timken Co. v.
United States, 5 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1080 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983); U.S. Steel Corp. v. United
States (U.S. Steel 1), 569 F. Supp. 870, 4 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 2449 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983), vacated
on other grounds, No. 84-12, (Ct. Int'l Trade Feb. 24, 1984); U.S. Steel Corp. v. United
States (U.S. Steel I1), 5 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1249 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983); Republic Steel Corp.
v. United States, 572 F. Supp. 275, 5 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1269 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983), vacated,
730 F.2d 1465 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. United States, 5 I.T.R.D. (BNA)
1333 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983); U.S. Steel Corp. v. United States (U.S. Steel III), 730 F.2d
1465, 5 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1955 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
70. Cunningham, The Current State of U.S. Import Relief Laws-Increased Importance
and Increased Complexity, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE POLICY: THE LAWYER'S PERSPECTIVE
I-1, 1-25 (Jackson, Cunningham, Fontheim eds. 1985).
71. Atlantic Sugar 1, 85 Cust. Ct. at 133; Atlantic Sugar 11, 2 I.T.R.D. (BNA) at 1586.
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to avoid placing it "under the unnatural and unremitting strain of having
72
to exercise constant self-censorship in their normal working relations."
The CIT's attitude changed slightly during appeals from the 1982 steel
determinations. In-house counsel for the seven American steel companies
involved had prepared the petitions and continued to represent the companies in the administrative and judicial proceedings. While six of the
steel companies had also retained outside counsel, U.S. Steel relied exclusively on its in-house counsel. Because of this involvement, the CIT
clearly had more difficulty in refusing disclosure to in-house counsel.
Nevertheless it held its ground:
It is only because the Court sees this information as having ineradicable importance that it takes this step. In the combination of its detail, and its scope,
the information is extremely potent. Its nature and volume place it beyond the
capacity of anyone to retain in a consciously separate category. When the Court
said in Atlantic Sugar that it was acting out of a desire to avoid placing lawyers
under an unnatural and unremitting strain, it was really expressing its rationale
indirectly and incompletely as a form of solicitude for the lawyers. The direct
and complete reason is that, in the Court's judgment, it is humanly impossible
to control the inadvertent disclosure
of some of this information in any pro73
longed working relationship.
The CIT repeated that the retention of outside counsel was a reasonable
way for the steel company to obtain the information and paid considerable
attention to the differences between corporate and retained counsel. Although it accepted the argument that in case corporate counsel was not
involved in pricing or other competitive decision-making, this did not alter
the fact that counsel, albeit somewhat isolated, still operated "within a
rather worldly cloister." 74 Furthermore, in the CIT's opinion, it could

reasonably assume that counsel would move into other roles and positions
within the company in the future. 7 5 On the basis of these considerations,
the CIT concluded that there was simply "a greater likelihood of inadvertent disclosure by lawyers who are employees committed to remain
76
in the environment of a single company."
The decision was reversed by the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit in an interlocutory appeal on a certified question arising from the
CIT decision. 77 An interesting aspect of the case was that the U.S. Gov-

72. Atlantic Sugar 1, 85 Cust. Ct. at 133.
73. U.S. Steel 1, 569 F. Supp. at 871-72.
74. Id. at 872.
75. The U.S. Steel I reasoning was incorporated by reference in Republic Steel and in
Bethlehem Steel.

76. U.S. Steel 1, 569 F. Supp. at 872.
77. U.S. Steel 111, 740 F.2d at 1465. The case is discussed by McIntyre, Can In-House
Counsel Be Trusted With Access To A Competitor's Confidential Information?: U.S. Steel
Corp. v. United States, 58 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 890 (1984).
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ernment joined U.S. Steel in arguing that the decision of the CIT constituted a per se ban on access by in-house counsel and should be reversed
in favor of a case-by-case analysis. 78 The Court of Appeals agreed with
this proposition and held that the decision whether or not to disclose
should be determined by the facts on a counsel-by-counsel basis. It was
wrong to give controlling weight solely to the classification of counsel as
in-house rather than retained:
[Both] are officers of the court, are bound by the same Code of Professional
Responsibility, and are subject to the same sanctions. In-house counsel provide
the same services and are subject to the same types of pressures as retained
counsel. The problem and importance of avoiding inadvertent disclosure is the
same for79both. Inadvertence, like the thief in the night, is no respecter of its
victims.

In summary, the current state of the law is that "individual circumstances must govern the development of a [court] protective order rather
than the status of counsel. ' 80 These circumstances should include an
assessment of the counsel-client relationship and the involvement of counsel in the trade case in question and in the planning of corporate com81
petitive decision-making.
Whether the Court of Appeals' judgment will lead to more or less
disclosure at the judicial level is not yet clear. Moreover, to what extent
the judgment affects the ITC "blanket" denial of disclosure to in-house
counsel remains to be seen. In the authors' opinion, this basically per se
distinction is unlikely to be upheld if challenged again.
H.

GOVERNMENT CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION

In countervailing duty cases major portions of the Commerce questionnaire are answered by foreign governments. 82 These governments will
normally request confidential treatment of the submitted information. The
question then arises whether this information can be released under protective order.
The broader issue of government secrets or confidential information is
treated in Executive Order 12356, promulgated in 1982.83 The foundation
78. U.S. Steel IH, 730 F.2d at 1467.
79. Id. at 1468.
80. Id.
81. The court of appeals found the term "competitive decision-making" serviceable "as
shorthand for a counsel's activities, association, and relationship with a client that are such
as to involve counsel's advice and participation in any or all of the client's decisions . ..
made in light of similar or corresponding information about a competitor." Id. at 1468 n.3.
82. As foreign governments are mainly involved in the determination of subsidization,
the discussion will be limited to Commerce practice. However, the same would seem to
apply in cases where the ITC requested information from foreign governments.

83. Executive Order No. 12,356, 47 Fed. Reg. 14,874 (1982).
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of the order is the balancing of (1) the interests of the public in being
informed of its government's activities and (2) the interests of the U.S.
Government to be assured that certain information concerning the national
defense and foreign relations will be safeguarded against unauthorized
disclosure. 84 Working from this premise, the governmental agency involved applies a balancing test. The guiding standard is that certain government agencies may classify information obtained from foreign governments if the disclosure of such information can reasonably be expected
to cause damage to the national security.
Under sections 1-303 and 1-203 of the Executive Order, the Secretary
of Commerce or his designee has the power to classify "foreign government information" as "secret" or "confidential." "Foreign government
information" is defined as:
1. information provided by a foreign government or governments, an
international organization of governments (e.g., the EEC), or any
element thereof with the expectation, expressed or implied, that the
information, the source of the information, or both, are to be held
in confidence; or
2. information produced by the U.S. pursuant to or as a result of a
joint arrangement with a foreign government or governments or an
international governmental organization, or any element thereof, requiring that the information, the arrangement, or both are to be held
in confidence.
Commerce regulations provide explicitly that foreign government information classified under the order is exempt from disclosure under protective order.85 Therefore a foreign government should always request
confidential treatment of the information submitted where appropriate.
However, this request will not automatically be granted by Commerce.
Notably, in cases where the materials are published or otherwise publicly
available or where the government acts as a conduit, 86 Commerce will
deny the request, 87 leaving the foreign government with the choice of
either retracting the documents and having the decision made on the basis
of the best evidence available (usually petitioners' allegations) or withdrawing the designation. The authors believe, however, that Commerce

84. Id. § 6.2, at 14,883-84.
85. 19 C.F.R. §§ 353.30, 355.21 (1985).
86. See, e.g., Ceramica Regiomontana v. United States (Ceramica I1), 557 F. Supp. 593,
4 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1481 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1982); Carlisle Tire & Rubber Co. v. U.S. Customs
Serv. (Carlisle 11), 663 F.2d 210, 219 n.63, 2 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1228, 1235 (D.C. Cir. 1980);
Carlisle Tire & Rubber Co. v. U.S. Customs Serv. (Carlisle 1), I I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1891
(D.D.C. 1979).
87. 19 C.F.R. §§ 353.29, 355.19 (1985).
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has generally taken a lenient attitude towards government requests for
confidentiality.
Different rules are applied by the CIT. The law 88 permits the CIT to
order disclosure of information provided to the United States by foreign
governments to parties, their counsel or any other person under such
terms and conditions as the CIT deems appropriate. This issue has arisen
in several cases 89 and over the years the CIT has come to look more
favorably upon disclosure under protective order. In early cases, the CIT
flatly refused disclosure on the basis of danger to national security without
even considering the contents of the materials: "[T]he status of foreign
government information is determined by the identity of the party that
submits the information, and not the nature of the information itself." 90
Considerable thought was given to the problem in the Ceramica Regiomontana cases. 9 1 The CIT noted that while the state secrets privilege
was well-established, it could not be considered "absolute" in view of
section 2641(b). 92 The CIT held in that case that the privilege was properly
asserted because of the following factors:
1. the party submitting the information was a foreign government;
2. the Mexican government requested, understood and expected the
materials to be treated confidentially;
3. the materials had been classified as confidential by Commerce pursuant to the Executive Order;
4. based on Commerce's classification, disclosure was presumed to
cause at least identifiable damage to the national security; and
5. the declaration by the Under Secretary of Commerce that disclosure
in contravention of assurances of confidentiality would be "preju93
dicial to our relations with Mexico."
The decision did, however, leave the door open for the party requesting
disclosure to establish that its opponents, the Mexican tile industry, had
had access to or input into the governmental documents. If so, a subterfuge
would have taken place and "equity and fundamental fairness [would]
require making the information equally available to intervenor [the Amer94
ican Tile Council]."

88. 28 U.S.C. § 2641(b) (1982).
89. See e.g., Carlisle I1,663 F.2d at 219 n.63; Ceramica Regiomontana, S.A. v. United
States (Ceramica 1), 4 Ct. Int'l Trade 267, 4 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1103 (1983); U.S. Steel If, 5
I.T.R.D (BNA) at 1249; Ceramica 11, 557 F. Supp. at 593; Carlisle Tire & Rubber Co. v.
U.S. Customs Serv. (Carlisle 1),1 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1891 (D.D.C. 1979).
90. Carlisle1, I I.T.R.D. (BNA) at 1897; see also Carlisle11, 663 F.2d at 210.
91. Ceramica1, 4 I.T.R.D. (BNA) at 1103; Ceramica II,557 F. Supp. at 593.
92. Ceramica1, 4 I.T.R.D. (BNA) at 1104.
93. Id.at 1104, 1105.
94. See Ceramica 1, 4 I.T.R.D. (BNA) at 1105; Ceramica 11, 557 F. Supp. at 595.
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The Carlisle and probably the Ceramica cases were overruled by U.S.
Steel v. United States, wherein Judge Watson of the CIT denied a motion
of the government for a protective order. The case involved a consolidated
action by domestic steel producers for review of the final Commerce
determination in a countervail case involving carbon steel plate from
South Africa and Brazil. The CIT found that the request for confidentiality
by a foreign government, the U.S. Government's classification under the
Executive Order, and the opinion of the Secretary of the Commerce Department that disclosure would damage international relations nevertheless did not make the information a state secret: "The potency of the
state secrets privilege is such that it ought not to be granted except in
cases of a palpable threat to national security just as the more exceptional
powers of the Executive ought not to be used except in cases of grave
95
peril."
The CIT explicitly rejected the approach that considered the source of
information (e.g., the Carlisle case) rather than its contents determinative
for the decision whether or not to disclose. The rule of U.S. Steel has
severely restricted the U.S. government's ability to invoke the state secrets privilege to prevent disclosure in proceedings before the CIT. The
CIT will examine the documents in camera and then make its own determination as to whether disclosure under a protective order would damage international relations. This decision will be based on the contents of
the government materials.
I.

COMMERCE AND

ITC

INTERNAL WORKING DOCUMENTS

In the course of antidumping or countervailing duty investigations, staff
of the administrative agencies circulate internal intraagency communications containing predecisional comments, opinions, pros-and-cons
statements, and the like. Numerous lawyers have tried to obtain these
documents in order to defend their clients properly. The government's
defense is usually to claim executive privilege. To invoke the claim, the
following requirements must be fulfilled:
1. executive privilege must be formally claimed by the agency;
2. it must be asserted by the head of the agency who personally considered the matter;
3. the materials must be reviewed; and
96
4. a proper affidavit must be submitted in support of the claim.

95. U.S. Steel II, 5 I.T.R.D. (BNA) at 1253 (emphasis added).
96. Asahi Chem. Indus., Ltd. v. United States, 1 Ct. Int'l Trade 21, 23, 2 I.T.R.D. (BNA)
1340, 1342 (1980).
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Thus far, all claims of executive privilege in the trade field appear to the
authors to have been upheld by the CIT.97 The rationale for this deferential
approach is well explained in Henkel Corp. v. United States:98
The privilege exists to encourage uninhibited and frank internal discussion in the for-

mulation ofgovernmental policy and decisionmaking. In the words of Mr. ChiefJustice Burger the privilege is necessary because "[h]uman experience teaches that those
who expect public dissemination oftheir remarks may well temper candor with a con-

cern for appearances.., to the detriment of the decisionmaking process."99

Nevertheless, the privilege is not "absolute, but qualified"; the CIT has held
repeatedly that it must weigh the need for the materials sought against the potential harm that would result from their disclosure. 100 "The question at the
core of any claim of executive privilege is whether the damage resulting from
disclosure outweighs the need for ajust resolution of a legal dispute." 101
To answer this question, the CIT will examine the documents in camera
and decide whether the documents are useful to the party 10 2 and whether
this usefulness outweighs the dangers inherent in disclosure. Until now,
however, the CIT has attached paramount importance to "the free and
uninhibited exchange of opinions and recommendations requisite to proper

administrative determinations."

03

II. Framework for the European Communities

A.

BACKGROUND

In the European Communities (the EC), the Commission of the European Communities (the Commission) essentially conducts antidumping

97. See, e.g., Asahi Chem. Indus., I Ct. Int'l Trade at 21; Melamine Chem., Inc. v. United
States, I Ct. Int'l Trade 65, 2 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1398 (1980); Henkel Corp. v. United States,
2 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1465 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1980); Silver Reed Am. v. United States, 2 I.T.R.D.
(BNA) 1552 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1981); Nakajima v. United States, 2 I.T.R.D (BNA) 1553 (Ct.
Int'l Trade 1981); National Latex Prods. v. United States (Latex 1), 3 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1459
(Ct. Int'l Trade 1981); National Latex Prods. v. United States (Latex 11), 3 I.T.R.D (BNA)
1794 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1982); West Coast Indus. Inc. v. United States, 3 I.T.R.D (BNA) 1925
(Ct. Int'l Trade 1982); Chevron Standard, Ltd. v. United States, 4 I.T.R.D (BNA) 1572 (Ct.
Int'l Trade 1983).
98. Henkel Corp., 2 I.T.R.D. (BNA) at 1466.
99. Id. (citing SCM Corp. v. United States, 473 F. Supp. 791, 82 Cust. Ct. 351 (1979)).
100. Silver Reed Am., 2 I.T.R.D. (BNA) at 1553; cf. Nakajima, 2 .T.R.D. (BNA) at 1555;
Latex I, 3 I.T.R.D. (BNA) at 1461.
101. Latex 1, 3 I.T.R.D. (BNA) at 1461 (citing Black v. Sheraton Corp. of Am., 371 F.
Supp. 97, 100 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1979)).
102. Latex 1, 3 I.T.R.D. (BNA) at 1461; West Coast Indus., 3 I.T.R.D. (BNA) at 1925.
103. Chevron Standard,4 I.T.R.D. (BNA) at 1573. The CIT appears more prone to accept
a claim of executive privilege than a claim of state secrets. One could raise the question to
what extent this differential treatment discriminates against the foreign government's "free
and uninhibited exchange of opinions and recommendations requisite to proper administrative determinations."
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and countervailing duty investigations. 10 4 Over the past five years the
Commission and the European Court of Justice (the ECJ) have substantially improved the procedural safeguards for parties involved in such
proceedings. The Commission, for example, "[tloday ... publishes considerably more information in the Official Journal,compared to the sketchy,
boiler plate type of reasoning typically used in the early days of [EC]
antidumping enforcement." 10 5 Furthermore, the EC antidumping and
countervailing duty regulation, Council Regulation no. 2176/84,106 contains several procedural safeguards, including: (1) the right of access to
the nonconfidential files; (2) the right to comment in writing and orally;
(3) the right to exchange thoughts with the opponent in so-called "confrontation hearings" (subject to agreement with the opponent); and (4)
the right to be informed of the essential facts and considerations on which
the Commission bases its decision. The ECJ, for its part, has recently
established the right of judicial review under article 173.2 of the EC treaty
involved in antifor exporters, dependent importers and complainants
07
1
proceedings.
duty
countervailing
or
dumping
B.

THE LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK

In the EC the Commission, the Council, and the Member States are
not allowed to reveal any information for which the submitting party has
requested confidential treatment without specific permission of the latter.10 8 The party submitting the information must indicate why the information is confidential and enclose a nonconfidential summary of the information or a statement of the reasons why such a summary is not
possible. 109 The Commission will determine whether the designation of
the documents as confidential is warranted on the basis of the standard
contained in Council Regulation no. 2176/84 that disclosure will be "likely
to have a significantly adverse effect upon the supplier or the source of
104. For an extensive and most up-to-date overview of trade laws and their administration
in the EC, see Van Bael & Bellis, International Trade Law and Practice of the European
Community (1985).
105. Van Bael, A Practitioner'sGuide to Due Process in EEC Antitrust and Antidumping
Proceedings, 18 INT'L LAW. 841 (1984).

106. Reg. No. 2176/84, 27 O.J. Eur. Comm. (No. L. 201) 1 (1984). This regulation is the
basic antidumping and countervailing duty regulation in the EEC as published in the Official
Journal, the EEC's official gazette comparable to the Federal Register.
107. For extensive discussions, see Bellis, Judicial Review of EEC Anti-dumping and
Anti-subsidy DeterminationsAfter Fediol: The Emergence of a New Admissibility Test, 21
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 539 (1984); Kuyper, Some Reflections on the Legal Position of the
Private Complainantin Various Procedures Relating to Commercial Policy, [1983] 1 LEGAL
ISSUES EUR. INTEGRATION 115 (1983).
108. Reg. No. 2176/84, supra note 106, art. 8, § 2(a).
109. Id. § 2(b).
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such information." 110 If such is not the case and the supplier is either
unwilling to make the information publicly available or to authorize disclosure in summary form, the Commission may disregard the information
and decide the case on the basis of the best information available.
The parties in an investigation may inspect all information made available to the Commission by any party to the investigation,"' provided
that the information is: (1) relevant to the defense of their interests; (2)
not confidential in the above sense; and (3) used by the Commission in
the investigation. Commission or Member State documents are excluded
2
from the right of inspection."l
Finally, the Commission is not precluded from disclosing general information or evidence relied on by the Commission so far as necessary
3
to explain its motivation in court proceedings."1
C.

CURRENT COMMISSION PRACTICE

Counsel for parties seeking access to Commission files are usually astounded at the vagueness of the nonconfidential files. 114 Indeed, contrary
to a European Parliament resolution 115 that the confidentiality provisions
of article 8 of the Council regulation" 16 should be interpreted as narrowly
as possible, the Commission seems to grant requests for confidential treatment liberally.
As of yet, only one case before the ECJ has attacked the designation
of documents as confidential by the Commission. 117 In that case the ECJ
held that all nonconfidential information submitted by EC or non-EC
corporations that had been used by the Commission during the investigation, and that had had a decisive influence on the decision, must be
made available to the complainant. The designation by the Commission
of certain price information, submitted by third country producers for the
purpose of establishing constructed value, as confidential was unacceptable in view of the fact that the complainant was "entirely dependent for
the defense of its interests on the factors on which the Commission based
l10. Id. § 3.
1ll. In Timex v. Council & Commission, Case 264/82, judgment of 20 Mar. 1985 (not yet
reported), the EC held that this term should be interpreted as including not only the parties
which are the subject of the investigation, but also the parties whose information had been
used to calculate the normal value of the relevant product (in this case, Hong Kong manufacturers). See Consideration 25.
112. Reg. No. 2176/84, supra note 106, art. 7, § 4; a concept analogous to "executive
privilege" in the United States.
113. Id. art. 8, § 5.
114. Cf. Van Bael, supra note 105, at 859.
115. 25 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 11) 37 (1982).
116. Reg. No. 2176/84, supra note 106, art. 8.
117. Timex v. Council & Comm'n, Case 264/82,judgment of 20 Mar. 1985 (not yet reported).
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8 Because the Commission had violated this procedural
its calculation." 11
requirement, the ECJ invalidated the antidumping duty.119

D.

DISCLOSURE BEFORE THE COURT

In Celanese120 an American importer brought a case against an EC
Council regulation' 2' imposing an antidumping duty. The applicant submitted documents to the ECJ for which it requested confidential treatment
and the ECJ had to determine to what extent this treatment could be
granted. The ECJ made a distinction between documents on the confidential status of which parties in the litigation agreed (Category I documents) and documents that would be submitted to the ECJ without prior
agreement (Category II documents).
The Category I documents automatically obtained confidential status.
The ECJ decided to examine Category II documents and hear the defendants. If the defendants disagreed, the ECJ could fix a period within
which the applicant might withdraw the documents. All confidential documents were placed in a special file to which only the parties and court
officers had access. Finally, the ECJ order provided that the ECJ reserved
the right to exclude from the file confidential documents if the use of such
material would be incompatible with the public nature of court judgments
or opinions of the Advocate General.
The issues in Celanese were completely different from the problems
discussed above with regard to court-ordered disclosure in the United
States. There, the documents in question concerned materials submitted
in confidence by parties to the administering agencies and the release
thereof to counsel for business competitors during the court proceeding.
Submission of new materials during the court proceeding is unlikely because the CIT reviews the case on the basis of the administrative record. 122 Celanese, however, involved submission of new materials 123 to
118. Id. Consideration 30.
119. The ECJ, however, allowed the duty to remain in force provisionally until the Commission had taken appropriate action.
120. Celanese Chemical Co. v. United States, Case 236/81, Court order of March 30,
1982, E.C.R. 1183 (1982). See also Riesenfeld, The Treatment of Confidential Information
in Antidumping Cases: A Comment on the Celanese Case, COMMON MKT. L. REV. 553

(1984).
121. 24 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 129) 1 (1981).
122. Cf. Stewart, Practice and Procedure in Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Investigations, As Experienced by Counsel for Petitioners and Other Domestic Interested
Parties, in THE COMMERCE DEPARTMENT SPEAKS ON IMPORT ADMINISTRATION AND Ex-

185, 230 (1984) and cases cited there. In practice, of course, counsel
frequently introduces new arguments, often based upon additional discovery that the court
allows. Letter of Peter Ehrenhaft to the authors (Jan. 22, 1985).
123. Riesenfeld, supra note 120, at 556.
PORT ADMINISTRATION
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the ECJ and the administrative agencies and maintenance of their confidential character.
E. A

FRAMEWORK FOR THE

EC

BASED

ON THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE

Disclosure of confidential information can take place at both the administrative and the judicial level. In the United States, at the administrative level, a slight bias appears to exist in favor of domestic producers.
Commerce, which receives the confidential information from foreign producers, generally discloses that information to counsel of petitioners under
a protective order. On the other hand, the ITC, which receives the confidential information from domestic U.S. producers, has taken a very
restrictive attitude toward disclosure. This approach has been sanctioned
by the CIT. However, there is a strong feeling among practitioners that
the law and regulations should be changed in order to permit more disclosure at the ITC level. This development is one that should receive the
endorsement of all parties involved in proceedings before the Commission
because it would improve the quality of the determinations.
In other respects, the experience with the disclosure provisions of the
1979 Trade Agreements Act has been satisfactory. The current tendency
124
is to favor more, rather than less, release of information.
At the judicial level, the CIT has also broadly interpreted its powers
to order or forbid disclosure. Generally speaking, rather than prohibiting
release of certain information per se, the CIT allows release, but shapes
its protective orders on a case-by-case basis to protect inadvertent disclosure. However, as discussed above, there is one exception to this
practice; release of information contained in internal agency documents
is almost uniformly denied.
In the EC, on the other hand, counsel for parties involved in dumping
or countervailing duty investigations are still "shooting in the dark." The
Commission realizes the disadvantages of this situation and is currently
considering changes in Council Regulation no. 2176/84125 that would permit disclosure of confidential information.
The authors suggest that, at least at the administrative level, the Commission should take a close look at the American system and consider to
what extent the Commission could adopt the U.S. framework. In the
authors' opinion, there are no reasons why the basics of the system would
124. An interesting detail is that in Canada the Import Tribunal discloses more information

on the injury side than does Revenue Canada on the dumping/subsidization aspects, thereby
taking an approach opposite to that of the U.S. agencies. On Canadian trade laws, see
HANDBOOK ON TRADE LAWS OF CANADA, UNCTAD/TAP/298 (1986).
125. See supra note 106.
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not work in the EC. Certain disadvantages in that system, such as the
discrepancy between Commerce and ITC disclosure rules, would even
be less likely to occur in Europe where the Commission conducts both
the dumping/subsidization and the injury investigations. And while the
U.S. system's success obviously rests to a great extent upon the deterrent
effect of the Draconian sanctions imposed for illegal disclosure, there is
no reason why similar sanctions could not be applied in the EC. Even
more than in the U.S., the firms practicing antidumping and countervailing
duty laws before the Commission are relatively few and highly specialized
in this matter. They would not be willing to run the risk of being disbarred
from practice before the Commission. Furthermore, like attorneys in the
U.S., attorneys in the EC are bound by Codes of Professional Responsibility, albeit those issued by the national bar associations. Devising a
system of disciplinary referral to those associations in case of breach of
a protective order poses no insurmountable difficulties. A system for
application of administrative sanctions like those in the United States
126
could be adopted by the Commission itself.
III. Conclusions
Antidumping and countervailing duty proceedings have changed radically in character over the last seven years. Until the signing of the 1979
GATT Antidumping and Subsidies Codes and their implementation into
American law by means of the 1979 Trade Agreements Act, the administrative aspect of such proceedings prevailed. Consequently, the U.S.
governmental agencies authorized to administer these laws performed
both investigative and adjudicatory functions.
27
Since 1980, however, trade law has become increasingly judicialized. 1
This judicialization has led to more adversarial proceedings in which legal
counsel for the parties involved criticize not only each other's submissions
but the agencies' decisions as well. It is submitted that the development
of legal counsel or, in other words, the parties themselves, taking over
part of the investigative duties of the administrative agencies has improved
the quality of the decision-making process. 128 In most instances, the parties involved have more resources at their disposal to generate the necessary data. The adversarial system of attack-riposte-counterattack is best
suited to discover and present these data. Obviously, a concomitant sine
126. In addition, disclosure likely would lead to a significant decrease in the workload of
the Commission. Interview with John Greenwald (Dec. 26, 1985).
127. The term is derived from Ehrenhaft, The "Judicialization" of Trade Law, 56 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 595 (1981).
128. This conclusion was shared by practically all of the attorneys interviewed by the
authors.
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qua non for optimal functioning of the system is access to the broadest
possible range of information submitted to the authorities by parties to
the investigation. In the United States this access is accomplished through
disclosure of confidential documents under an administrative protective
order.
This article has analyzed the U.S. law and practice concerning administrative and judicial disclosure of confidential business and governmental
information in antidumping and countervailing duty cases. The authors'
conclusion, shared by most of the trade lawyers interviewed by them, is
that overall the system has functioned satisfactorily. The sanctions against
breach of the protective order have proved to be a sufficient deterrent.
In the EC access to confidential information is still nonexistent. Apart
from the fact that counsel's access to confidential information would undoubtedly improve the quality of the decision-making process, basic rules
of due process require that counsel for parties in an antidumping or countervailing duty investigation should have the right to see the information
that is presented to the Commission by their opponents, and on the basis
of which the Commission makes its decisions, in order to defend their
clients' interests as efficiently as possible.
Building on these contentions, the authors conclude that no major reasons exist why the Commission should not adopt the basics of the American system. The best way for the Commission to proceed would be to
publish proposed guidelines and organize a public hearing in which interested parties would be invited to comment. This approach would present a basis for necessary interaction between Commission officials, practitioners, and others active in this area of the law.
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